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I
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR BETrER PLANNING

A.

The Intractable Problem of Caseload Growth in the Federal Courts

A broad consensus exists today on the need to reduce the federal caseload.
There are, to be sure, a few holdouts protesting that things really are not all
that bad (motivated partly, I suspect, by fears that reform may make them
worse). But a fair-minded evaluation of the federal docket makes it difficult to
resist the conclusion that something should be done. Apart from brief
periods in the 1920s and 1940s when case filings suddenly increased and then
decreased,' caseload growth was moderate in the district courts and virtually
nil in the courts of appeals from the late 1800s until approximately 1960.2
The period beginning 1958-62, however, marks a sharp turning point. Since
then, caseload growth has been consistently very large in both trial and
3
appellate courts, and it shows no signs of abating.
Let me recount some statistics. Although the bottom line is familiar, the
numbers are striking enough to bear repetition. 4 Since 1960, case filings have
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1. These "bulges" in case filings are attributable to Prohibition and World War II price control
legislation. See Keith 0. Boyum & Sam Krislov, eds, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts 12
(Academy Press, 1980) (Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration ofJustice).
2. See id; Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 65-66 (Harvard U Press, 1985).
3. See Posner, The Federal Courts at 65-66 (cited in note 2); Judicial Conference of the United
States, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 4-9 (April 2, 1990). Unlike the two earlier
bulges, the rapid growth of the past 30 years remains largely unexplained. See Marc Galanter, The
Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis L Rev 921.
4. The figures in the text are from the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. These data are analyzed in greater detail in Part I of the Report
to the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and
Their Relation to the States ("Subcommittee Report on the Role of the Federal Courts"), published
separately as Part III of the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (cited in note 3). See also
Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the FederalCourts, 1990 BYU L Rev 67, 67 nl;
Posner, The Federal Courts at chs 3, 4 (cited in note 2).
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increased by 250 percent in the district courts and 900 percent in the courts of
appeals. This growth has been partially offset by new judicial appointments,
but filings per judge increased during the same period by 55 percent in the
district courts and 336 percent in the courts of appeals. Measured in terms of
difficulty, this growth reflects a substantial increase in the workload of federal
judges. In the district courts, for example, the amount of time each judge
must spend in court has increased by 35 percent. A more refined measure,
"weighted" case filings (which adjust raw caseload data to account for the
relative amount of time required for different cases), indicates that the total
workload of each district court judge doubled between 1962 and 1988. In the
courts of appeals, the increase has been still more dramatic. Terminations
after oral argument or the submission of briefs have increased by more than
600 percent since 1960. Even taking new appointments into account, the
number of appeals heard by each court of appeals judge has more than
tripled. And while the percentage of cases decided by a signed, published
opinion decreased from 74 percent to 38 percent, the number of such
opinions increased from thirty-one per judge in 1960 to more than forty-six in
1988.
Federal judges have responded to this growth by working longer hours
and delegating more work to non-judicial personnel, especially law clerks and
staff attorneys. 5 A recent survey of federal judges reports pervasive
complaints about hours, stress, and the difficulty of finding time to do the job
well. 6 It is tempting to dismiss such complaints as self-aggrandizing, but their
frequency and vehemence suggests that something more is involved-as does
the surprisingly large number of judges who indicate that they might not
7
accept a nomination if it were offered again.
Federal judges also have responded to caseload growth by changing the
way they process their cases. Important innovations in the district courts
include the development of case management techniques and the
proliferation of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). In the courts of
appeals, significant developments include decreasing the number and length
of oral arguments and deciding more cases by summary order.
A push for legislation to address caseload growth began almost
simultaneously with the increase in filings. 8 In recent years, this reform
5. See Subcommittee Report on the Role of the Federal Courts at 40-91 (cited in note 4).
6. Id at 40-46.
7. Id at 91. The survey conducted by the Federal Courts Study Committee found that if
offered the job again, 57% of courts of appeals judges would have to "give the matter careful
thought," while 9% would decline the offer. Id.
8. The American Law Institute began its study of the allocation of jurisdiction between state
and federal courts in 1960, after Chief Justice Warren expressed concern for the "constant upward
trend in the total volume" of cases. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between the State and
Federal Courts ix (Am Law Inst, 1969). Judge Friendly wrote his influential book calling for reform
to control the "explosion" of federal court litigation in 1973. HenryJ. Friendly, FederalJurisdiction: A
General View (Columbia U Press, 1973). Chief Justice Burger identified the need for caseload relief
early in his tenure and pressed this theme throughout his term as head of the judicial branch. See,
for example, Warren Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciary, 1972, 58 ABA J 1049 (1972).
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movement has been dominated by calls for more widespread use of case
management and ADR-an ironic attempt to turn a symptom of the problem
into its solution. The caseload growth of the past thirty years is a matter of
concern because it has compromised the quality of adjudication in the federal
courts. But insinuating judges into the dispute resolution process with an
independent agenda of docket reduction, reducing procedural protections
based on judges' uninformed or only partly informed impressions of a case,
and deciding appeals without oral argument or a reasonably thorough
explanation hardly advance the cause ofjustice. Indeed, the fact that caseload
growth has made such responses seem reasonable is itself strong evidence
that something should be done to relieve the pressure.
In any event, even aggressive case management and ADR offer only
modest hopes for docket relief. For example, there is evidence that case
management produces faster dispositions, 9 but no evidence that it is costeffective.' 0 Case management requires relatively intense judicial involvement,
particularly in the early stages of litigation, and, as Judith Resnik has said,
"the judge's time is the most expensive resource in the courthouse."i
Because most cases are resolved without trial anyway, judges may spend time
managing cases that would have settled without the judge, and the result may
be a net waste of judicial resources.' 2 The same also may be said of ADR.
Indeed, critics of ADR suggest that it may actually invite litigation by
depriving potential litigants of authoritative decisions.' 3 There is reason to
doubt this claim since, if anything, we already have too much precedent, but
the important point is simply that little empirical evidence supports the claim
that ADR saves judicial resources. As with case management, ADR's
implications for the federal docket are uncertain at best.
Another way to reduce the workload of federal judges might be to appoint
more of them. Until recently, adding judges was Congress's favorite response
to caseload growth.' 4 But this approach may finally have run its course due to
mounting opposition from judges.' 5 Moreover, while some of this opposition
9. See generally Steven Flanders, Case Management and Court Management in United States District
Courts (Fed Jud Ctr, 1977).
10. See D. Marie Provine, Settlement Strategiesfor Federal Districtjudges 38-40 (FedJud Ctr, 1986)
(evaluating studies on case management and finding the evidence that these save judicial time
inconclusive).
11. See Judith Resnik, Managerialjudging, 96 Harv L Rev 374, 423 (1982).
12. See Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988J Dispute Res 56, 73.
13. See, for example, Richard Posner, Summary Jury Trials, 53 U Chi L Rev 366, 382-88 (1986);
William T. Gallagher, The Transformation of Justice: Hofrichter's Neighborhood justice and Harrington's
Shadow ofJustice, 13 L & Soc Inquiry 133, 134 (1988) (collecting studies).
14. There were 321 federal judges in 1960. Congress then created new positions in 1961, 1966,
1968, 1978, 1982, 1983, and 1984. By 1970, there were 479 federal judges; by 1980, the number
had grown to 626. There are now more than 700 judges filling 743 authorized judgeships in the
district courts and courts of appeals. See Chemerinsky & Kramer, 1990 BYU L Rev at 68 n2 (cited in
note 4); Subcommittee Report on the Role of the Federal Courts at 94 n1 (cited in note 4).
15. The usual argument against appointing more federal judges is that this will diminish the
quality of the federal judiciary by straining the effectiveness of the appointment process, depreciating
the prestige of being a federal judge, generating too much administrative work, and reducing
collegiality. See Friendly, Federaljurisdiction at 28-31, 39-41 (cited in note 8); Jon 0. Newman,
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may be self-serving, Congress should exercise caution before creating many
more judgeships. The federal judicial system has evolved so that we now rely
on the courts of appeals for final decisions on most legal questions. It was not
always so. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court decided
virtually all appeals. By the 1860s, growth in the federal docket led to
complaints that lack of appellate capacity left individual trial judges with too
much unreviewable discretion. Although this problem had become quite
serious by the end of Reconstruction, political difficulties delayed a solution
until 1891, when Congress enacted the Evarts Act, creating the present courts
of appeals. 16

The strategy adopted in the Evarts Act is based on the recognition that
effective appellate review requires a relatively small court of appeals to
maintain consistent and uniform positions with respect to the trial courts.
Because the federal caseload was too large for a single appellate court,
Congress compromised by establishing a few intermediate appellate courts
with jurisdiction over relatively large areas. Each court was small enough to
assure reasonable uniformity within its jurisdiction. And as long as the
number of circuits was kept small, the Supreme Court could resolve conflicts
among the courts of appeals.
Enlarging the courts of appeals undermines this scheme. Each new judge
increases geometrically the number of different panels that may hear a case.
Other things being equal, more panels mean more uncertainty about how the
court is likely to rule in any particular case, thereby encouraging more appeals
and making intra-circuit conflicts more likely. At the same time, as the court
grows, it becomes more difficult to hear cases en banc and to obtain a majority
in cases that are heard by the whole court. Before long, even en banc review
no longer ensures uniformity. Pressure then grows to divide the circuit. But
that merely increases the likelihood of splits among the circuits, shifting
responsibility for maintaining uniformity back to the Supreme Court, which
already has its hands full.
These concerns are not hypothetical. Problems of size and maintaining
intra-circuit uniformity already have led to the division of the Fifth Circuit and
may soon do the same to the Ninth. To be sure, some commentators argue
that problems of managing a large circuit have been exaggerated,' 7 but not
even these commentators suggest that creating more courts of appeals as
large as the Ninth Circuit is desirable. Yet at current growth rates, the
number of new appointments would soon make the present Ninth Circuit
seem small. If caseload pressures are to be relieved by appointing more
judges, however, the only alternative to giant courts of appeals is more courts
RestructuringFederalJurisdiction:Proposals to Preserve the FederalJudicialSystem, 56 U Chi L Rev 761, 76267 (1989). I have explained elsewhere why I believe that these arguments are overstated.
Chemerinsky & Kramer, 1990 BYU L Rev at 69-72 (cited in note 4).
16. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat 826, codified at 46 USC § 46 (1988). See Felix Frankfurter &
James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 69-102 (Macmillan, 1927).
17. See, for example, Joe S. Cecil, Administration of Justice in a Large Appellate Court: The Ninth
Circuit Innovations Project (Fed Jud Ctr, 1985).
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of appeals-an uninviting prospect that simply shifts pressure back to the
court least able to handle it, the Supreme Court. Either way, the effectiveness
of appellate review is weakened.' 8
A third way to reduce the federal workload is to reduce the scope of
federal jurisdiction by eliminating unimportant categories of cases so that
judges can devote more time to the cases that remain. The strong opposition
to even the most modest recommendations of the Federal Courts Study
Committee 19 (with the consequent likelihood that only insignificant, technical
recommendations will be enacted 20 ) underscores the difficulty with this
approach. There may be widespread support for reducing the scope of
federal jurisdiction, but there are numerous ways to do this and strong
opposition to each one. Because interest groups with narrow, focused
demands can often overcome more diffuse support for broad reform, 2 ' none
of these solutions has been adopted. Hence, supporters of diversity
jurisdiction argue that this jurisdiction is essential and suggest that Congress
reduce the federal docket by repealing rights like those conferred in the
Federal Employer's Liability Act 2 2 and the Jones Act.2 3 Lawyers for railroad

employees and seamen (and their unions) say that these rights are too
important to abandon and recommend instead that Congress concentrate on
reducing frivolous prisoner petitions. Civil rights advocates respond that
prisoners must have access to federal courts and counsel Congress to
eliminate diversity. And so the buck gets passed around and around; in the
24
end nothing is done.
18. Another solution is to adopt one of the proposals for an intermediate court to resolve
conflicts among the circuits. A full discussion of the complications attending this solution is beyond
the scope of this article, but the literature on the subject indicates that the various proposals to create
such a court all have significant problems. See, for example, Commission on Revision of the Federal
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendation for Change, 67 FRD 195
(1975); Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload in the Supreme Court,
57 FRD 573 (1972).
19. Congress created a 15-member Federal Courts Study Committee in Title I of the Judicial
improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-702, 102 Stat 4642, codified chiefly
in scattered sections of 28 USC, ordering it to "examine problems and issues currently facing the
courts of the United States" and "develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary
.... " 102 Stat 4644. The committee's report, submitted to Congress on April 2, 1990, contains a
broad range of recommendations about restructuring the federal courts and modifying federal
jurisdiction. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (cited in note 3).
20. See, for example, Congress Cool to Proposals to Ease Load on Courts, 48 Cong Q 1073
(April 7, 1990).
21. See, for example, Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American
Democracy 315 (Harper & Row, 1986); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public
Choice, 65 Tex L Rev 873, 887 (1987).
22. 45 USC §§ 51 et seq (1988).
23. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Star 988, codified at 46 USC § 597 (1988).
24. Judges are not entirely free of self-serving opposition to useful reform. Concern for prestige
and the desire for a varied docket lead most Article III judges to oppose the creation of special courts
with limited jurisdiction. See, for example, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of
the United States 60 (1986) ("TheJudicial Conference has consistently opposed the establishment of
specialized courts in the judicial branch."); Carroll Seron, Court Reorganizationand the Politicsof Reform:
The Case of the Bankruptcy Court, in Philip R. Dubois, ed, The Politics of Judicial Reform 94-95, 97
(Lexington Books, 1982). This opposition is at least partly responsible for discouraging even modest
experiments with an approach to adjudication that works well everywhere else in the world.
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In any event, even if Congress could agree on what cases to remove from
the federal docket, this would provide only a short-term solution. The federal
docket necessarily evolves with the nation's substantive goals, and the
business of the federal government changes too fast and is too controversial
for federal jurisdiction to remain stable. No one foresaw in the 1850s that
federal courts would be needed to protect myriad new federal rights by the
end of the 1860s. No one thought in the years before the eighteenth
amendment that a huge investment of federal judicial resources would be
necessary to enforce Prohibition, just as no one foresaw when the amendment
was ratified how short its life would be and how quickly this business would

disappear. Of more recent vintage, I doubt that many people in the mid1950s anticipated how important civil rights cases would become. And no

one would have predicted as recently as five years ago that we would begin a
"war on drugs" requiring a massive investment of federal judicial resources
(just as no one can predict how long this demand will last). Our national
priorities change so quickly that about the only thing of which we can be sure
is that tomorrow's docket will look very different from today's. New laws will
be enacted; unforeseen problems will arise; new accommodations will be
required.
The lesson is not that the situation in the federal courts is hopeless. On
the contrary, after more than a quarter century, we may finally have reached
the point where Congress will adopt some combination of these three
approaches-informal procedures, additional judgeships, and reduced
jurisdiction-to relieve the caseload burden. But the forces that delayed
congressional action for so long will not suddenly disappear. If any lesson is
to be drawn from the analysis above, it is that the dynamics of judicial reform
discourage Congress from acting until problems become serious (something
that is true of many other areas as well). Assuming, then, as seems likely, that
the federal docket continues to grow and change, we will soon be back in the
same position.
We can, however, delay the recurrence of these problems and perhaps
reduce their severity by encouraging Congress in making judicial resources
available more efficiently. To this end, I propose to establish an agency to
assist Congress to make informed decisions about how to structure federal
jurisdiction when it enacts new legislation. I make no extravagant claims
about the benefits of this proposal. It will not solve all our problems.
Pressures will still build as new laws are enacted, old laws are reinterpreted,
and other changes affect the amount of litigation. But better planning as we
go along may provide modest benefits by deferring these pressures and
minimizing the costs to everyone in the meantime.
B.

Groping in the Dark: Causes and Effects of Inadequate Planning

There is currently no formal mechanism to assure that judicial resources
are utilized efficiently. The closest thing that now exists in Congress is the
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Office of the Law Revision Counsel in the House of Representatives. 2 5 But
while this body's statutory mandate is broad enough to permit it to serve a
planning function, 2 6 lack of resources has limited it to the largely ministerial
task of keeping the United States Code up to date. As a result, Congress gives
little systematic consideration to the impact of new legislation on the federal
courts. What planning takes place is done haphazardly in committee, and on
those occasions when serious consideration is given to structuring federal
27
jurisdiction, questions of efficiency are seldom in the foreground.
Entities with some planning responsibilities do exist in both the executive
and judicial branches, namely, the Office of Legislative Affairs in the
Department of Justice and the Office of Legislative and Public Affairs in the
Administrative Office. But these offices lack the resources and expertise to
conduct the necessary analyses. What assistance they do provide thus tends
to be sporadic and impressionistic when the necessary assistance should be
systematic, technical, and comprehensive. Moreover, because these agencies
are not part of Congress, they have a limited ability to demand attention and
are often treated more like lobbies than helpmates. In fact these offices are
lobbies, seeking to advance the particular agendas of the executive and
judicial branches (which do not necessarily include making optimal use of
judicial resources in implementing a particular substantive law2 8 ).

The absence of an agency capable of, and responsible for, evaluating
judicial jurisdiction under proposed legislation and disseminating the relevant
information to members of Congress occasionally leads to spectacular
failures, such as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.29 This
legislation gave claimants a right to compensation for illness or death
resulting from vaccination. Apparently, no one in Congress considered the
need for special arrangements to adjudicate cases arising under the new law;
adjudication was left to the district courts. The resulting flood of litigation
25. See Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 2 USC §§ 28 5-285g (1988).
26. 2 USC § 285b lists among the office's functions the duty to submit a revision of the laws to
remove "ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections both of substance and of form," and to
provide the Judiciary Committee "with such advice as the committee may request in carrying out its
functions with respect to the revision and codification of the Federal statutes."
27. See Geoff Gallas, Judicial-Impact Statements: Administration, Behavior, and Politics, in Philip
Dubois, ed, The Politics ofJudicial Reform 151 (Lexington Books, 1982); Cornelius M. KerwinjudicialImpact Statements and Court Management: And Never the Twain Shall Meet, in Philip Dubois, ed, The
Analysis ofJudicial Reform 171 (Lexington Books, 1982) ("Never the Twain Shall Meet"); Robert P. Davis
& Paul Nejelski,justice Impact Statements: Determining How NVew Laws Will Affect the Courts, 62 Judicature
18, 19 (1978); Burger, 58 ABAJ at 1049 (cited in note 8). See generally Hearings on the State of the
Judiciary and Access to Justice before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Committee on theJudiciary, 95th Cong, 1st Sess (1970) (CIS
H No 521-8, Govt Printing Office, 1977).
28. For example, while the Department of Justice represents the United States in the district
courts, the Internal Revenue Service handles cases in the Tax Court; this gives the department an
interest in preserving or extending district court jurisdiction over refund actions. Similarly, as noted
above, concerns for prestige and the desire for a varied caseload lead most Article IllI judges to
oppose the creation of limited courts of special jurisdiction even when such courts make sense in
terms of overall resource allocation. See generally Seron, Court Reorganization and the Politics of Reform
(cited in note 24) (discussing opposition to giving bankruptcy judges Article III status).
29. Pub L No 99-660, 100 Stat 3743, 3755-84 (1986), codified at 42 USC § 300aa (1988).
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proved difficult to handle. It took more than a year to secure legislative relief,
with Congress eventually shifting a large part of the burden to the Claims
Court.

30

Most inefficiencies in the use ofjudicial resources are less dramatic. Some
problems, for example, derive from Congress's failure to resolve simple
housekeeping matters, such as whether a law applies retroactively or confers a
private cause of action. 3 ' These statutory gaps create uncertainty and foster
needless litigation. Other problems have more fundamental causes.
Congress may vest concurrent jurisdiction in several courts, creating forum
shopping opportunities that generate conflicting decisions and additional
litigation. 3 2 Or Congress may make an agency's decisions reviewable in both
the district courts and the courts of appeals when a single tier of Article III
review would suffice. 3 3 Or Congress may fail to anticipate the amount or
nature of litigation likely to arise under particular legislation and so fail to
provide adequate judicial resources. Standing alone, the consequences of
such failures are seldom striking enough to elicit the same quick response as
the Vaccine Injury Act. But the cumulative effect of these incremental
inefficiencies may be great and may needlessly exacerbate federal caseload
problems.
One may, of course, legitimately ask whether the same forces that stymie
judicial reform legislation will similarly frustrate planning. The difference is
that, rather than relating to separate legislation for the courts, planning will
be part of the process of formulating particular substantive legislation.
Attempts to promote judicial reform through direct legislation facilitate
concentrated opposition. By instead offering discrete recommendations
concerning pending legislation, planning will take place in a context in which
the forces that ordinarily impede change have largely been overcome.
The process that determines whether and when particular substantive
legislation may be enacted is complex and unpredictable. Policy analysts talk
about "streams" that flow through a decisionmaking structure: one stream
consists of problems; another consists of solutions, often generated by
persons whose job is to develop such ideas and not necessarily in direct
response to a particular problem; still a third stream consists of participants
34
who drift in and out of government advocating pet problems or solutions.
30. See Robert A. Katzman, ed, Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 7-8 n4
(Brookings Inst, 1988).
31. See Hearings on S 1482 before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of
the SenateJudiciary Committee, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 167 (1988) (statement of Stephen J. Markman).
32. See, for example, Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction at 161-71 (cited in note 8) (discussing
problems with the trifurcated jurisdiction of the tax court, claims court, and district courts over tax
cases); Larry Kramer,jurisdiction over Civil Tax Cases, 1990 BYU L Rev 443 (same).
33. See Richard E. Levy, Social Securitv Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Reform, 1990
BYU L Rev 463; David P. Currie & Frank 1. Goodman,JudicialReview of Administrative Action: Quest for
the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum L Rev 1, 23-39 (1975) (evaluating the Social Security Administration,
the National Labor Relations Board, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Benefits
Review Board for longshoremen's and black lung cases).
34. See John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 90 (Little, Brown, 1984).
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As one group of commentators describes it, organizations like Congress are
"a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues
35
to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work."
Periodically, these separate streams come together. A problem is
recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes it the right time
for change: a "policy window" opens, presenting an opportunity for action
on a given initiative. During this period, forces that ordinarily impede reform
are at their weakest, and lawmakers are most open to ideas about how to make
improvements. During this period, then, it becomes feasible to make
recommendations about the most efficient way to structure federal
jurisdiction for cases arising under the new legislation.
Several additional factors may help to create breathing room for
intelligent planning while legislation is being formulated. First, while it is
usually clear who wins and who loses under established legal practices, the
likely implications of different forms of adjudication may be ambiguous before
a law is enacted, weakening opposition to any particular form. Second,
questions of procedure may not be central to the debate over new legislation,
since attention will usually be focused on the substantive provisions of a
proposed law.
While these considerations suggest that a planning agency could be
effective, some obvious questions concerning methodology and feasibility
must be addressed. A full evaluation of the proposal's merits thus requires a
more thorough understanding of the agency's functions. Moreover, because
there are different reasons for inefficient deployment ofjudicial resources, the
proposed agency will have to undertake several tasks. The next section
discusses these in greater detail.
II
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY

A.

Reviewing Proposed Legislation

The primary function of a planning agency would be to assist the
committees of Congress in preparing legislation. I already mentioned, for
example, the problem of statutory omissions. Congress often fails to specify
such matters as who can sue, what the proper limitations period is, whether
state law is preempted, what types of relief are available, and other
housekeeping matters. Sometimes, of course, these gaps are deliberate.
Congress may leave aspects of a law unclear as a political compromise or
because an issue that could not be resolved was not important enough to
prevent passage of the legislation altogether. But there are also cases of
oversight, and much needless litigation could be prevented by a preliminary
review of legislation with an eye toward its administration by the courts.
35. Michael D. Cohen, James G. March & John P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice, 17 Admin Sci Q 1, 2 (1972).
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One simple method of avoiding inadvertent omissions is to devise a
legislative checklist of frequently overlooked issues for use by the relevant
congressional committees.3 6 Many items might be included on such a
checklist. The Department ofJustice produced a list of twelve. 3 7 The Federal
Courts Study Committee added six items to this list.38 It is easy, moreover, to
think of still other issues that might be included: Are litigants entitled to a
jury trial? Can federal courts enjoin inconsistent state proceedings? Is the
states' sovereign immunity overridden? Is final action by administrators
subject to judicial review, and, if so, in what court?
We do not, of course, need a new agency to examine proposed legislation
to see whether it includes the provisions specified on a checklist. Both Houses
of Congress created Offices of the Legislative Counsel to review proposed
legislation for clarity of expression. 39 Once a list is prepared, either of these
offices or the relevant congressional committees or subcommittees could
review legislation for inclusion of the relevant items.
We do, however, need someone to generate, refine, and update the
checklist. This task may be more difficult than it appears. The lists prepared
by the Department of Justice and the Federal Courts Study Committee, for
example, are simultaneously overinclusive and incomplete. They are
overinclusive in that many items, such as those pertaining to laws that create
or utilize an administrative agency, are relevant only for certain kinds of
legislation. At the same time, the proposed lists are incomplete because they
overlook other issues that arise frequently in the same specialized contexts.
In the administrative law context, for example, questions such as who has
standing to sue or whether an agency may make de minimis exceptions are
commonplace. 40 It might therefore be useful to develop different lists for
different kinds of legislation. The task of generating these lists (and keeping
36. This proposal has been made by others. See, for example, Hearings on S 1482 at 167 (cited
in note 31); Katzman,Judges and Legislators at 183-84 (cited in note 30); Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee at 91-92 (cited in note 3).
37. The Justice Department's proposed checklist called for consideration of the following: (1) a
civil statute of limitations; (2) retroactivity; (3) the availability of attorney's fees, and, if available, the
terms under which a fee award would be proper; (4) preemption; (5) the mens rea necessary to
establish criminal liability; (6) the advisability of a private cause of action; (7) severability; (8) a
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies; (9) standards governing the assertion of personal
jurisdiction; (10) a provision permitting arbitration; (11) definitions of key statutory terms; and (12)
whether administrative proceedings should be formal or informal. See Hearings on S 1482 at 206-07
(cited in note 31). See also Legal Impact Statement: One Proposal for Painless Court Reform (Dept
ofJustice Office of Legal Policy, Dec 1987) (discussing cases in which each of the listed items was a
problem).
38. To the items listed in the Department of Justice proposal, the Federal Courts Study
Committee added: (1) whether the proposed legislation would repeal or otherwise change the
meaning of existing federal legislation; (2) whether state courts are to have jurisdiction and, if so,
whether an action would be removable to federal court; (3) what types of relief are available; (4)
whether a deadline for judicial action is necessary or reasonable; (5) whether there is a need to use
multi-district panels; and (6) whether the statute applies to the territories, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee at 91-92 (cited in note 3).
39. 2 USC §§ 275 (Senate), 281a (House) (1988).
40. For a list of statutory interpretation issues in the administrative context, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 476-93 (1989).
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them up to date as new issues arise and old ones fade in importance) could be
delegated to the new agency-which could then either assume the additional
responsibility of reviewing legislation for compliance or leave this task to
some other body in Congress.
While useful, the task of administering a legislative checklist is less
important than examining proposed legislation to make recommendations
about structuring federal jurisdiction. The value of such recommendations
was explained in Part I and hardly seems controversial. 4' It is their feasibility
that is debated. Some commentators argue that our ability to foresee
demands for judicial services resulting from particular legislation is so limited
that we should abandon the effort altogether. 4 2 However, while the
difficulties with projecting caseloads are real, we can still do a great deal of
useful planning.
The debate over caseload forecasting began with a 1972 proposal by Chief
Justice Burger to have all legislation accompanied by a "court impact
statement" prepared by the reporting committee and indicating "how many
more judges and supporting personnel will be needed to handle the new
cases."

43

This proposal's relatively quick demise resulted in part from

disillusionment with impact statements in other contexts, especially
environmental law. 4 4 For the most part, however, the ChiefJustice's proposal
failed because of methodological flaws. For example, a number of
commentators argued that an across-the-board requirement for impact
statements would simply become a proforma exercise, producing "tedious and
45
inconclusive work" of little value.
More fundamentally, critics argued that we lack "the basic theoretical and
empirical knowledge" necessary to make the estimates called for by Chief

41. See also Report of the Department ofJustice Committee on Revision of the Federal Judicial
System, The Needs of the Federal Courts 16-17 (1977) ("an agency is needed to project trends,
foresee needs and propose remedial measures") ("The Bork Report"); Kerwin, Never the Twain Shall
,Weet at 171 (cited in note 27) (successful use of forecasting "would constitute one of the most
important reforms in the history of the federal-court system"); Jerry Goldman, Richard L. Hooper &
Judy A. Mahaffey, Caseload Forecasting 11odeLi for Federal District Courts, 5J Legal Stud 201, 203 (1976)
("forecasts can only improve the process of translating demand for services into resource
availability").
42. See, for example, Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts (cited in note
1).
43. See Burger, 58 ABAJ at 1050 (cited in note 8).
44. See Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts at 21-23 (cited in note 1)
(problems with inflation, economic, and environmental impact statements suggest caution before
adopting judicial impact statements); Davis & Nejelski, 62 Judicature at 20-21 (cited in note 27)
(same with less pessimistic conclusion).
45. See, for example, Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts at 4, 21 (cited
in note 1);Paul Nejelski, Judicial Impact Statements: Ten Critical Questions We Maust .Vot Overlook, 66
Judicature 122, 124-25 (1982); Gallas, Judicial-Impact Statements at 155 (cited in note 27) ("the
indiscriminate judicial-impact statement methodology is an example of technocratic overkill and
grandiose thinking, modes of action and thinking that characteristically hinder policy
implementation").
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Justice Burger. 4 6 Just identifying the factors that affect case filings under
particular legislation can be difficult. What, for instance, determines the
number of employment discrimination cases? Racism is obviously important,
but so are a multiplicity of other factors, including the difficulty of finding
alternative employment, the availability of unemployment benefits, societal
perceptions of discrimination, the efficacy of alternative state law remedies,
the number of lawyers, and so on. Second, even if we successfully identify the
relevant factors, we must develop a model that accurately captures their
relationship to case filings. Of the factors just listed, which are more and
which are less important to case filings? How much more or less important?
Third, forecasts rely on past events to make assumptions about the future, but
there is no guarantee that past trends will continue. If new circumstances
arise or factors affecting past trends change, past experience may turn out to
47
be a poor guide.
These difficulties are compounded by three additional problems. First,
forecasting litigation requires making predictions about the behavior of
potential litigants, their lawyers, judges, court personnel, and other
government regulators. Consider, for example, the following questions, all
relevant in predicting the amount of litigation likely to arise under a new law:
How widespread are transactions that could give rise to liability? What
48
proportion of potential plaintiffs will consult a lawyer and pursue a lawsuit?
What proportion of defendants will settle before litigation is commenced?
Will lawyers be reluctant to bring this type of litigation? Will judges and
other court personnel put these cases on the fast track or send them to the
back of the court queue? Although the answers to these questions may vary
for different laws and different affected groups-with obvious implications for
forecasting-our ability to make such predictions is limited.
Second, regulated entities learn from and react to the conditions created
by new laws. One might assume, for example, that as a new law succeeds, the
number of transactions that give rise to litigation will decline-and with that
the number of lawsuits will also decline. But if deterrence results from
successful lawsuits, this very success may encourage plaintiffs to sue in a
46. Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts at 3 (cited in note 1). The
problems identified in the following paragraphs are drawn principally from Boyum and Krislov, and
from Kerwin, Never the Twain Shall Meet (cited in note 27).
47. Furthermore, the factors upon which predictions are based may themselves be based on
predictions. Predicting the number of available lawyers or the size of welfare benefits can be as
complicated as predicting caseloads. Yet any caseload forecast will only be as good as these
underlying estimates.
48. There are wide variations in how likely someone is to resort to litigation for different claims.
One study showed that only 1% of those who believed they had suffered job discrimination consulted
a lawyer; this compares to 12% of those who had problems with their landlords, 11% of those who
believed their constitutional rights were violated, 23% of those whose children were injured, 36% of
those who had suffered personal injuries, and 70% of those who were involved in a divorce. See
Barbara A. Curran & Frances 0. Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public 83-84, Table 6.3 (Am Bar
Found, 1974). See generally William L. R. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence
15 L & Society Rev 631 (1980-81)
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.
(developing a framework to understand the emergence of lawsuits).
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larger proportion of the potential cases. The law may thus deter without a
corresponding decrease in the number of lawsuits. Similarly, Congress may
try to reduce the number of filings by raising the amount in controversy
required for jurisdiction. But if the parties can simply inflate their damages
claims (because, for instance, elements of damages like pain and suffering or
punitive damages are not easily quantifiable), the number of cases may decline
49
very little or not at all.

Finally, the factors relevant to making predictions are interactive:
predicting what will happen to one may depend on what happens to another.
The level of unemployment benefits may be affected by the level of
unemployment; perceptions about whether discrimination is widespread may
affect attitudes toward racism; state law remedies may be created or altered in
response to federal remedies. Such interactions are especially common with
respect to the behavioral considerations mentioned above. The desire of
clients to pursue litigation is obviously influenced by whether lawyers are
encouraging, and lawyers' attitudes are just as obviously affected by how
receptive judges seem to be. Legal subsystems also interact in ways that
complicate the process of making predictions. By increasing administrative
demands on assigned counsel systems, for example, the Speedy Trial Act
affected programs established a decade earlier in the Criminal Justice Act. 50
This act may also have had a pervasive effect on civil litigation, requiring
judges to devote more time to criminal cases and thereby creating new delays
in obtaining a civil trial.
Do these problems make caseload planning impossible? I do not believe
so. To begin with, the problems identified apply mostly to proposals that, like
Chief Justice Burger's, require quantifying expected filings. But quantitative
analysis is not the only useful kind of planning, nor is it even the most
important kind. There is also "qualitative resource estimation,"si which
offers policymakers guidance on the likely forms of litigation under proposed
legislation in ways that do not require the level of precision needed for Chief
Justice Burger's impact statements. Rather than indicate how many additional
judges or support personnel Congress should appoint, qualitative analysis
addresses such questions as: Which court or courts should have jurisdiction?
Should Congress rely wholly or partly on administrative adjudication? Should
it create a specialized tribunal? Are special procedures needed or desirable?
By deepening lawmakers' understanding of the general contours of expected
litigation, qualitative analysis enables them to choose the most effective and
efficient way to structure federal jurisdiction without the need for numerical
forecasts.
49. See Larry Kramer, DiversitJurisdiction, 1990 BYU L Rev 97, 99.
50. Cornelius M. Kerwin,judicial Implementation of Public Policy: Judges and Legislationfor the Courts,
16 HarvJ Leg 415, 438 (1979) (Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC § 3161 (1988) (enacted in 1984); Criminal
Justice Act, 18 USC § 3006A (1988) (enacted in 1975)).
5 1. See Cornelius M. Kerwin, David Koehler & John Dawson, Resource Estimation, Implementation,
and Poli0 , Optimization, 3 Policy Stud J 1070, 1070-73 (1980).
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A few illustrations should clarify the nature of this analysis. In Part I, I
offered as an example of inefficient deployment of judicial resources the
decision to subject an administrative agency's decisions to two tiers of Article
III review when one could be made sufficient. This example describes the
system of reviewing Social Security disability determinations. 5 2 In 1972,
Congress enacted legislation bringing several welfare programs, including the
new federal Supplemental Security Income program, under the jurisdiction of
the Social Security Administration. 5 3 Recognizing that the number of
54
administrative determinations under this scheme would be enormous,
Congress wisely decided not to permit direct appeals from the agency to the
courts of appeals. Instead, Congress provided a first tier of review in the
district courts, taking advantage of these courts' greater capacity in order to
55
screen out many appeals.
In adopting this strategy, Congress overlooked some pertinent
considerations. Social security appeals are typically fact-bound and often turn
on complex disputes involving technical, medical, or vocational questions.
General jurisdiction judges have no special expertise in these areas. Even the
legal issues involved in disability determinations are often the sort of technical
matters on which courts normally defer to agency expertise. To make matters
worse, many district judges apparently believe that a large percentage of
social security appeals are frivolous. Between this belief and their heavy
caseload, few judges are willing to devote time to sifting through these
difficult records for error. The problems are further exacerbated by
institutional weaknesses that make district courts ill-suited for appellate
review: 56 several days of the week must be devoted to conducting trials, and
most of the remaining time is needed for related matters. Review of disability
claims records is thus either overlooked or shunted off to clerks, staff
attorneys, or equally unenthusiastic magistrates. In the end, rather than make
a serious effort to understand the issues, many judges simply invoke the easy
solution of reversing at the first sign of something fishy and remanding for the
57
agency to make a better record.
Full consideration of these factors might have led Congress to try a
different strategy. For example, Congress might have established a
specialized tribunal to hear first level appeals, with further review at the
discretion of the courts of appeals or limited to questions of law. Because the
52. Unless otherwise indicated, my discussion of the Social Security disability claims process is
drawn from Levy, 1990 BYU L Rev at 467 (cited in note 33), and Subcommittee Report on the Role
of the Federal Courts at 285-353 (cited in note 4).
53. Social Security Amendments of 1972, 42 USC § 1614 (1972).
54. In any given year, between 200,000 and 300,000 cases are heard by an administrative law
judge; 50,000 to 100,000 of these cases also require hearings before the Appeals Council of the
Social Security Administration. See Levy, 1990 BYU L Rev at 481 (cited in note 33).
55. See Currie & Goodman, 75 Colum L Rev at 24-25 (cited in note 33).
56. The institutional difficulties of appellate review in the district courts were explained to me by
Judge Judith Keep of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
57. See Jerry L. Mashaw, et al, Social Security Hearings and Appeals 132-33 (Lexington Books,
1978).
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new tribunal's docket would consist entirely of disability claims, its judges
would acquire the familiarity and expertise necessary to understand the
difficult factual disputes at the heart of most disability cases. In addition, the
enhanced authority and prestige of such a court would attract the ablest
specialists in the disability field, further improving the quality ofjustice. Such
a court could thus dispose of cases more efficiently and produce greater
uniformity of results while affording claimants a more thorough examination
of their claims than is currently provided by federal district judges. 58
The question whether to channel Social Security appeals to a specialized
court or to the district courts is, of course, more complicated than this brief
discussion suggests. A more complete analysis, which is beyond the scope of
this article, has been done elsewhere. 59 But the very complexity of the
question helps make my point that we need a permanent body whose job is to
make recommendations about structuring jurisdiction. On the one hand,
while sometimes controversial, this kind of analysis is plainly feasible and, as
the example suggests, has enormous potential benefits. On the other hand,
the task cannot be done ad hoc by persons who are not fully versed in the
difficulties involved.
Another example of qualitative analysis comes from an article by Professor
John Donohue, a participant in this symposium, and Peter Siegelman of the
American Bar Foundation. 60 Discussing the adjudication of employment
discrimination disputes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Donohue and Siegelman describe how the typical case has changed over the
years. Whereas in the early years most Title VII suits challenged hiring
policies based on allegations of an unlawful pattern and practice, more
recently the typical case has been an individual claim for wrongful discharge
or failure to promote. This shift may be explained by the success of the
statute: as more protected workers enter the workforce, more opportunities
arise for acts that may be challenged as discriminatory. Moreover, because a
single hiring action may create employment opportunities for many workers,
the growth in individual disparate treatment claims has been geometric
relative to hiring actions. Cases challenging hiring practices outnumbered
termination cases by 50 percent in 1966; by 1985, the ratio was reversed by
61
more than six to one.

58. Relying on essentially these justifications, the Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended that Congress create a "Court of Disability Claims." See Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee at 55-57 (cited in note 3). Unfortunately, and for many of the reasons discussed in
Part I, the prospects that Congress will follow this recommendation are slim. See notes 19-24 and
accompanying text. I believe that the recommendation would have had a better chance had it been
made when Congress first established the disability claims process.
59. See authorities cited in note 52. For a different, though not unsympathetic view, see
Mashaw, et al, Social SecuritV Hearings and Appeals at 146-50 (cited in note 57); Jerry L. Mashaw,
BureaucraticJustice 185-209 (Yale U Press, 1983).
60. See John )onohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983 (1991).
61. Id at 1015-21.
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These factors were available for analysis when Title VII was enacted. Had
Congress considered them, it might have structured litigation under the law
differently. For example, rather than have all actions brought in federal court,
Congress might have given the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") power to adjudicate individual wrongful discharge claims, perhaps
using the adjudication of similar claims by the National Labor Relations Board
as a model. The federal courts still would have been available to decide cases
with broad implications for employment policy, but the agency could have
decided the more routine disputes between an employee alleging that his or
her discharge was invidiously motivated and an employer claiming that the
discharge was legitimate. Such an allocation of authority might have
prevented or reduced the influx of Title VII cases into the federal courtswhere today they are generally thought to represent a significant part of the
caseload problem-without any sacrifice in the law's efficacy. Of course, had
Congress decided to vest the EEOC with adjudicatory powers, it would have
had to staff and finance the agency differently from the outset. At the time,
unfortunately, there was no one to undertake the analysis that Donohue and
62
Siegelman have undertaken only in hindsight.
It is easy to cite other examples where an ounce of this sort of prevention
might have avoided the need for a pound of cure. 63 Once a law is enacted,
however, it becomes difficult to change the structure of jurisdiction (for
reasons explained in Part I). By establishing an agency to conduct qualitative
analyses prior to the enactment of legislation, judicial resources may be
used to better advantage. The agency would act in a support capacity,
performing the necessary evaluations of projected caseloads and making
recommendations about the most efficient way to structure jurisdiction.
Qualitative resource estimation is not all that such an agency could do, for
even as applied to quantitative caseload analysis-that is, predicting the
number of cases-the objections to forecasting are overstated. One can take
almost any task, break it down into as many subtasks as imagination allows,
maximize the risk of error for each subtask, and in this way prove that the task
cannot possibly be performed. When I was a law student, Richard Epstein
used this technique to persuade my torts class that driving a car was
impossible. No one, he argued, could simultaneously track the car's speed;
watch the road for people and other cars; read, translate, and react to traffic
62. The full story is more complicated. Proposals to give the EEOC adjudicatory powers were
made in 1964 but were defeated because of fears that the agency would be too pro-employee. See
FrancesJ. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 BC Indust & Comm L Rev 431, 436-37, 450-54 (1966).
Arguments about resource allocation might have had some impact on this debate, but probably
would not have changed the outcome. The example thus underscores the limits that politics will set
on any planning mechanism. It does not follow that political factors will always dominate.
Unfortunately, because the analysis required for any particular legislation is sufficiently complex to
be beyond the scope of this article, my choice of illustrations is limited to those few areas where the
work has already been done and can be summarized. This, of course, helps underscore the need for
an agency of the type I propose.
63. For instance, Part I also mentions the problem ofjurisdiction over civil tax disputes, where
more careful planning could have avoided much wasteful litigation. See note 32 and accompanying
text.
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lights and road signs; and coordinate finger, wrist, forearm, and shoulder
muscles with toe, foot, calf, and thigh muscles to control the steering wheel
and the pedals in response to all these stimuli. This example basically
describes the attack on caseload forecasting.
But of course we can drive cars. And we can make caseload predictionsperhaps not as well as we drive, certainly not perfectly, but well enough to
obtain substantial information to use in making policy. Even the harshest
critics of caseload prediction concede that some accurate forecasting is
possible, 64 and proponents are much more optimistic.

65

Social scientists and

policy analysts have already developed a variety of techniques for making
predictions: mathematical models that take multiple variables into account,
supplemented by expert opinions to anticipate surprise events; 6 6 computer
simulations; 6 7 case flow and resource consumption models; 6 8 demonstration
projects; 6 9 and other forms of structural modeling. 70 The explanation of how
such techniques work is a topic well beyond the scope of this article (and the
expertise of its author). Suffice it to say that these methods have been and can
be used to make some successful caseload forecasts.
Having said that, I must add a word of caution. Critics may overstate the
case in contending that methodological difficulties make caseload forecasting
impossible, but the difficulties are real. Existing techniques are crude, and
considerable refinement is needed before we can confidently predict how
many cases of a particular type are likely to follow from new legislation.
Indeed, we may never be able to make such predictions with precision.
But then, precision is not really necessary. Particularly as Congress
becomes more reluctant to relieve caseload pressures by creating new
judgeships, the importance of quantitative caseload estimates will diminish.
The real utility of quantitative analysis may be to supplement qualitative
analysis. It is important to know that the mix of cases under new legislation is
likely to be predominantly of one type rather than another, and a sense of the
relative magnitude of any differences would be still more helpful. This much
we can do. Perhaps we cannot determine whether the mix will consist of
12,535 cases of one type and 3,672 cases of another, or 11,123 and 5,074, but
64. See Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts at 3 (cited in note 1);
Kerwin, Never the Twain Shall Meet at 173, 176 (cited in note 27).
65. See Goldman, Hooper & Mahaffey, 5 J Legal Stud at 201 (cited in note 41); Davis & Nejelski,
62 Judicature at 18 (cited in note 27); Gallas,judicial-ImpactStatements at 158 (cited in note 27).
66. See Goldman, Hooper & Mahaffey, 5J Legal Stud at 201 (cited in note 41). This technique
is not only the most technically complex, but also the most ambitious and successful experiment in
caseload forecasting. The authors developed several models and tested them against real data,
concluding that "[t]he proposition upon which this forecasting effort was based is sound; forecasts of
district court caseload can be calculated by the use of social, political, demographic, and economic
indicators." Id at 233.
67. See Paul Nejelski, Computer Simulation: An Aid to Court Study, 55 Judicature 17 (1971).
68. See Kerwin, Koehler & Dawson, 3 Policy StudJ at 1074-76 (cited in note 51).
69. See Barbara Curran, Legal Services for Special Groups (Am Bar Found Res Contrib No 1, 1972)
(describing various projects); Boyum & Krislov, Forecastingthe Impact of Legislation on Courts at 87 (cited
in note 1).
70. See Boyum & Krislov, Forecasting the Impact of Legislation on Courts at 95-97 (cited in note 1).
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that information is not essential. In any event, while we must accept the
fallibility of efforts to estimate caseloads and the risk of error inherent in such
forecasts, it would be foolish to conclude that because we cannot estimate
perfectly, we should not estimate at all: "In the land of the blind, the oneeyed are kings." Nor will we remain even partially blind for long, for as we
gain experience with caseload forecasting techniques, our vision is likely to
improve.
B.

Reviewing Decisions of the Courts and the Executive Branch

An agency to examine legislation while it is under development may
improve Congress's ability to use judicial resources efficiently, but it is not
enough. No matter how well this agency does its job, some statutory gaps,
glitches, and ambiguities will escape notice and make their way into the world
72
to cause trouble for courts and litigants. 7 1 In addition, as explained below,
the proposed agency would not review all pending legislation, and some laws
that are overlooked will undoubtedly have unanticipated effects on the federal
caseload. Finally, there surely will be instances when the agency's
recommendations for structuring federal jurisdiction turn out badly and
require correction.
More importantly, not every problem in the judicial system results from
action taken (or not taken) when laws are enacted. Interpretations by other
branches often alter legislation in ways that have profound consequences for
the federal courts. By recognizing an implied cause of action, for example,
the courts may unexpectedly change the anticipated level of enforcement and
increase the volume of litigation. 73 Similar consequences follow from judicial
decisions expanding liability under statutes that were formerly read narrowly.
Take the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,7 4 which interpreted 42
U.S.C. section 1983 to impose liability for deprivations of constitutional rights
by state officers even if the officers' actions were not authorized or were
forbidden by state law. Prior to Monroe, litigation under section 1983 was
infrequent; one commentator reports finding only nineteen cases in the U. S.
Code annotations during the statute's first sixty-five years. 75 Since Monroe,
section 1983 litigation has grown like Topsy, and cases brought under this
statute constitute a much larger portion of today's federal docket. 76 An even
71. See Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legslators Who Won't, in
HenryJ. Friendly. ed, Benchmarks 41-64 (U Chi Press, 1967); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber,
The Intercircuit Committee, 100 Harv L Rev 1416, 1421-23 (1987); Proceedings of the 49th Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 FRD 241, 319-21 (1988) ("DC Circuit
Proceedings").
72. See text accompanying note 99.
73. See, for example, Superintendent of Insurance v Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 US 6, 13 n9 (1971)
(private cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act);J.I. Case Co. v Borak, 377 US
426 (1964) (private cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
74. 365 US 167 (1961).
75. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the lWake of Monroe v Pape, 82 Harv L Rev 1486, 1486
n4 (1969).
76. See 1988 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Fable C-I. Other commentators suggest that the growth in § 1983 litigation is less
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better example may be judicial decisions interpreting the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") to reach non-traditional
racketeering activity by legitimate businesses that commit more than one
77
predicate act.

Nor are judicial interpretations the only source of new problems for the
federal courts. Changes in executive policy may have equally dramatic effects.
The number of cases brought by social security disability claimants rose
dramatically in the early 1980s as a result of policies instituted by the Social
Security Administration ("SSA"). 78 Intended to reduce the welfare rolls,
these new policies instead provoked a phenomenal number of claims
challenging SSA's determinations. This influx did not abate until the mid1980s, when SSA altered some of its policies and Congress enacted legislation
overruling others. Another example of executive action with dramatic
consequences for the federal caseload is the President's recently declared
"war on drugs." Because criminal cases take more time (particularly trial
time) than civil cases, and because the Speedy Trial Act mandates processing
criminal cases quickly, the anticipated increase in prosecutions from this effort
will very likely impede civil litigation. According to some judges, their time
79
will soon be spent exclusively on criminal matters.
Of course, Congress hardly needs a new agency to inform it of such well
known problems. But these are just illustrations. The vast majority of
decisions that affect the federal caseload are less newsworthy and receive no
publicity or fanfare. This does not mean that these decisions do not create
real problems, and the cumulative effect of many small problems can be
devastating. At present, however, there is no one responsible for reviewing
decisions of the courts and executive branch for their impact on judicial
administration."0 One might expect this task to be performed by
congressional staff, but these personnel have too many other responsibilities
to stay current on every decision by every court or administrator on issues
within their purview. 8 ' As a result, decisions go unnoticed until the problems
they create have become serious. By then, various interest groups have
spectacular than is commonly assumed. See, for example, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab,
What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System, 56 U Chi L Rev 501 (1989); Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 Cornell L Rex 101 (1987). Moreover,
not all of the growth is attributable to Monroe v Pape; much of the credit goes to decisions that
broadened the scope of constitutional protections and fostered a sympathetic environment for such
claims. Be that as it may, judicial interpretations that expanded the scope of this statute clearly
increased the amount of litigation. The same thing may be said of judicial decisions holding other
civil rights statutes applicable to wholly private conduct. See, for exampleJones v ,4lred H. Mayer Co.,
392 US 409 (1968) (42 USC § 1982 (1988)); Runyon v AcCrarv, 427 US 160 (1976) (42 USC § 1981
(1988)).
77. See, for example, Sedima, S.TR.L. v lmrex Co., 473 US 479 (1985).
78. See Levy, 1990 BYU L Rev at 478-509 (cited in note 33).
79. See Subcommittee Report on the Role of the Federal Courts at 45-46 (cited in note 4).
80. Katzman, edJudges and Legislators at 7 (cited in note 30).
81. An informal survey by one commentator found that while congressional staff members tend
to be aware of major Supreme Court decisions, they have little knowledge of other decisions. See
DC Circuit Proceedings at 323-24 (cited in note 71).
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invested in the new status quo and have acquired a stake in preserving it; as
explained in Part I, getting Congress to act becomes quite difficult.
Identifying a problem quickly and routing it to the appropriate committee
in Congress may make it easier to obtain corrective action, since fewer groups
will have a substantial interest in blocking change. Accordingly, a second
function of the planning agency could be to review decisions of the other
branches and apprise Congress of those with significant implications for
judicial operations. While the forces that impede reform may make revision
of judicial and executive decisions more difficult than preenactment planning,
there is still reason to expect significant benefits.
This idea is not new. Justice (then Chief Judge) Cardozo proposed
creating a "Ministry of Justice" to review judicial decisions in 1921,
attributing the idea to earlier writings by Roscoe Pound and Jeremy
Bentham.82 Cardozo's proposal was part of a broader movement that led to
the establishment in most states ofjudicial conferences and in many states of
law revision commissions.8 3 The former are typically responsible for running
the state's judicial bureaucracy and for updating its rules of procedure and
evidence. The latter more closely approximate the kind of entity I am
proposing for the federal system in that state law revision commissions are
usually responsible for examining laws and judicial decisions and making
recommendations for reform to the legislature.
Experience with state law revision commissions has generally been good,
and several states, particularly New York and California, have had notable
success.8 4 The New York Law Revision Commission was responsible for that
state's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), 8

5

which helped

create momentum for the UCC's nationwide acceptance. The California
commission produced an evidence code that has been the basis for practically
all subsequent reform in the field.8

6

In addition to such large projects, both

the New York and California Law Revision Commissions have made many less
82. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv L Rev 113, 114 (1921), citing Roscoe
Pound,Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 AmJ Society 721, 729, 731 (1917);John Bowring, ed, 9
The Works of Bentham 597-612 (Simpkin Marshall, 1843). The proposal to create such a ministry
apparently originated in an 1828 speech on law reform by Lord Brougham. It was then picked up by
Bentham in his draft for a constitutional code, and in 1856 was offered in the House of Commons as
a resolution to create a "Department of Public Justice." See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking at 59
(cited in note 71).
83. Russell R. Wheeler & Donald W. Jackson,judicial Councils and Policy Planning: Continuous Study
and Discontinuous Institutions, 2 Just Sys J 121, 125-30 (1976).
84. See, for example, Survey, The District of Columbia Law Revision Commission, 34 Cath U L Rev
1309 (1985); Henry G. Fins, The Illinois Law Revision Commission, 29 DePaul L Rev 443 (1980);John W.
MacDonald, The New York Law Review Commission: The Past and the Future, 13 SLU L Rev 258 (1968);
Ferdinand F. Stone, The Louisiana State Law Institute, 4 AmJ Comp L 85 (1955); Ralph N. Kleps, The
Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849-1953, 42 Calif L Rev 766 (1954); Bernard L.
Shientag, A Ministry of Justice in Action: The Work of the New York State Law Revision Commission, 22
Cornell L Q 183 (1937).
85. MacDonald, 13 SLU L Rev at 260 (cited in note 84).
86. See Recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission Proposing an Evidence
Code, in 29B Calif Code Ann xxiii (West, 1966) (originally published as Report and
Recommendation of the California Law Review Commission, Jan 1965).
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prominent, but still useful, recommendations. Through 1984, 163 of 185
recommendations made by the California Law Revision Commission had
been adopted in whole or in part by the state's legislature. 7 In its first
twenty-three years, the New York Law Revision Commission submitted 315
recommendations dealing with 245 subjects, of which 181 were enacted. 88
These successes have led other commentators-among them judges,
legislators, and executive officials-to recommend creating a law revision
89
commission for the federal government.
By also functioning as a law revision commission, a planning agency could
do still more to facilitate efficient use of judicial resources. 90 Moreover,
having a single agency both review pending legislation and track its postenactment implementation should generate synergies that improve the
agency's performance. Caseload forecasting is a relatively new idea. Over
time, the new body would gain experience that would improve the quality of
its recommendations. This learning process would be aided immeasurably if
the persons responsible for forecasting future growth were also responsible
for reviewing how courts respond in practice.
C.

Improving Communication Between the Branches

A third potential function concerns communication between Congress and
the other branches of government. Even a well-budgeted, fully staffed
planning agency will miss some problems that arise in the course of
administering federal law. These problems are not likely to be overlooked by
those who must live with them, however. The judges and executive branch
officials responsible for day-to-day administration are thus an invaluable
source of information about how to improve the judicial system. Yet
communication between the branches on such matters is sporadic and
unsatisfactory. Justice Cardozo wrote in 1921:
[t]he means of rescue are near for the worker in the mine. Little will the means avail
unless lines of communication are established between the miner and his rescuer. We
must have a courier who will carry the tidings of distress to those who are there to save

87. 17 Cal L Revision Commission Reports 829-43 (1985).
88. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking at 59-60 (cited in note 71). In addition, the New York Law
Revision Commission served as the model for similar commissions in Australia and the Sudan. See
Carolyn Gentile, Historical Overview, in 1985 New York L Revision Commission 38, 47.
89. See, for example, The Bork Report at 16-17 (cited in note 41); Ginsburg & Huber, 100 Harv
L Rev at 1430-32 (cited in note 71); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Pleafor Legislative Review, 60 Cal L Rev
995 (1987); DC Circuit Proceedings at 321-27 (cited in note 71); A Bill to Establish an Intercircuit
Panel, and for Other Purposes, Hearings on S 704 before the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 36 (1985) (letter from Justice John Paul Stevens, Oct 25,
1983); Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking at 58-64 (cited in note 71); Katzman, ed,Judges and Legislators at
126-27, 176 (cited in note 30); Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, The Law Revision
Commission, 3 HarvJ Legis 361 (1966).
90. My proposal differs from the typical law revision commission in some important respects.
While the typical state law revision commission may propose any kind of substantive reform, my
proposed agency would focus on inefficiencies in the deployment of federal judicial resources.
Furthermore, while most state law revision commissions focus on obscure statutory or common law
doctrines, my proposed agency would more frequently be involved in current matters with high
profiles.
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when the signals reach their ears. Today courts and legislature work in separation and
aloofness. The penalty is paid 9 both in the wasted effort of production and in the
lowered quality of the product. '

This statement remains true nearly seventy years later. Members of
Congress and their staff say that more input from judges is desirable. 92 Yet
judges and executive officials complain constantly that they are unable to
communicate their concerns to Congress. 93 The complaint is not that doors
in Congress are closed, but rather that the judges and officials do not know
whom to contact. I should add a caveat: the complaint about not knowing
whom to contact does not include budgetary or staffing problems, or
controversial issues like habeas corpus in capital cases. Rather, the gap in
communication exists for less prominent issues, especially technical statutory
issues. On these matters, judges and executive branch officials are apparently
unsure whom to inform and so tend to say nothing.
A third function of a planning agency thus could be to facilitate
communication between Congress and the other branches by acting as liaison.
If a judge renders a decision that he or she believes calls for a legislative
response, or if an executive official comes across a problem and believes
Congress ought to solve it, the judge or official could contact the agency,
which would be responsible for referring the matter to the appropriate
committee in Congress. Perhaps this task of referring issues could be coupled
with a requirement to research them and make a recommendation. This
procedure would save considerable time by weeding out frivolous
suggestions. In addition, like the law revision function, processing and
reviewing complaints from other branches would contribute to the education
94
of agency staff on how laws work in practice.
III
STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY

While the discussion in Parts I and II explains the usefulness of better
planning in preserving judicial resources, one may legitimately ask whether
this function requires a new agency. Why not utilize existing bodies like the
Office of the Law Revision Counsel in Congress, or the Office of Legislative
Affairs and the Office of Legislative and Public Affairs in the legislative and
judicial branches? If the problem is lack of resources, Congress can simply
provide these agencies with additional funding.
But the problem with existing institutions is more fundamental than lack
of resources. None of these entities currently conducts the kind of caseload
analysis and review of decisions that I propose. None of them is staffed by
91.
92.
93.

Cardozo, 35 Harv L Rev at 113 (cited in note 82).
DC Circuit Proceedings at 324 (cited in note 71).
See, for example, the essays by Frank M. Coffin, Roger H. Davidson & Hans A. Linde in

Katzman, ed,Judges and Legislators (cited in note 30).

94. Communication between the branches could be improved in other ways as well. Better
understanding of how different branches function might be facilitated through simple face-to-face
meetings of judges, members of Congress, and their staffs.
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persons with the training or experience necessary to generate and evaluate
the data. The Office of the Law Revision Counsel does no analytical work. As
for the Legislative Affairs Offices in the executive and judicial branches, these
are basically lobbies for their respective branches, and nothing would cripple
a planning agency faster than to be seen as simply another lobby.
Consequently, none of these existing entities provides an appropriate
foundation upon which to build a technical support organization.
But what chance does a new agency have to succeed? Most observers are
understandably pessimistic about proposals for reform that call for expanding
the federal bureaucracy-assuming that any new agency is likely to become
the tool of some interest group; an independent political force pursuing its
own self-seeking agenda; or powerless, meaningless, and ignored. But while
it is always possible that an agency will fall victim to one of these forms of
administrative failure, it is not inevitable. Moreover, we can reduce the risks
by structuring the agency properly.
The most important question is, in which branch should the new planning
agency be located? This issue is controversial, particularly for judges. The
judicial bureaucracy is extremely protective of its position as Congress's
primary source of information about the needs of the courts, and it strongly
opposes the creation of a judicial planning agency outside its control. 95
Nonetheless, I believe the planning agency should be located in the legislative
branch. As Judge Friendly observed, "[iut would seem elementary that an
agency whose task is to [help] formulate legislation ...

should be attached to

96

the legislature."
Congress is far more likely to heed recommendations from
a body within the legislature than from the other branches. Furthermore,
placing the new agency in the legislative branch will produce closer working
relationships and greater trust between its staff and that of Congress, thereby
lending credibility to the agency's work. Support for these conclusions is
demonstrated by the success of existing support agencies in Congress, such as
the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment,
and the Congressional Budget Office. Experience with state law revision
commissions also suggests that such bodies work better when located in the
95. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended creating an "Office of Judicial Impact
Assessment" similar to the proposal made here. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
at 91-93 (cited in note 3). This recommendation originated in the Committee's Subcommittee on the
Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation to the States, of which I was the reporter. The
subcommittee recommended establishing the agency within Congress, and this aspect of the
proposal evoked strong opposition from the Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference.
Indeed, these bodies may have shown more interest in blocking this proposal than in any other
aspect of the Committee's work. In the end, the Committee modified the Subcommittee's
recommendation to locate the new planning body within the Judicial Conference. Id.
96. See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking at 62 (cited in note 71). See also Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee at 92-93 (cited in note 3) (additional views of Congressman Robert W.
Kastenmeier). The location of the agency seems to be limited to either the legislature or the
judiciary. Little interest exists from the executive branch in assuming these new responsibilities, and
general agreement exists that it is the least appropriate location for a judicial planning agency. See
Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Katzman, ed, Judges and Legislators at 117, 127
(cited in note 30).
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legislative branch. This placement, for example, appears to be one of the
factors distinguishing the successful New York and California commissions
97
from their less successful counterparts in other states.
While placement of the planning agency may have some bearing on its
effectiveness, the best guarantee of success is good work. A planning agency
is most likely to succeed if it establishes a reputation for producing quality
work. As explained in Part II, one reason for centralizing the various
functions in a single agency is that cumulative experience with forecasting and
review should lead to improved methodology and a better understanding of
the data and their limits. 98 There are, moreover, a number of additional steps

that may further improve the quality of the agency's work.
The single most important consideration in this regard is staff. To
succeed, the planning agency must have a professional staff with expertise in
the various functions to be performed. Caseload forecasting requires training
in economics, social science, cr statistics in order properly to identify and
analyze the social, political, economic, or demographic factors relevant to
particular legislation. It also requires the insight of someone familiar with law
and courts. Legal training is needed for the agency's review functions, which
require understanding the implications of judicial opinions for future cases.
The agency staff must therefore include persons from different disciplines
who can work together on various projects. The more highly qualified the
staff, the more likely the agency is to perform impressively.
While Congress obviously must oversee the agency, its members should
neither participate directly in the agency's work nor be responsible for day-today operations. The sensitive nature of the agency's assignment makes it
susceptible to political forces that may want either to control or to impede its
conclusions. Such problems cannot be avoided altogether, but they can be
minimized by establishing the agency as an independent, technical support
group.
Another important consideration is the scope of the agency's
responsibilities. One of the most telling criticisms of Chief Justice Burger's
proposal for court impact statements was that requiring such statements for
every proposed bill would lead to pro forma statements of little informative
value. 99 Thousands of bills are introduced in a typical session of Congress,
most of which never pass and would have little or no impact on the federal
courts if they did. To require the same level of review for all these bills would
swamp the planning agency with useless work. A better approach would be
either to give all bills a cursory examination to determine which may
potentially have a significant impact on the federal courts (something akin to
the Supreme Court's certiorari review), or to wait until a committee or
subcommittee of Congress has indicated real interest in proposed legislation.
97.
Role of
98.
99.

See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking at 62 (cited in note 71); Subcommittee Report on the
the Federal Courts at 151 (cited in note 4).
See Davis & Nejelski, 62 Judicature at 129 (cited in note 27).
See note 45 and accompanying text.
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Either approach would free agency staff to concentrate on the laws most likely
to benefit from detailed review.
A third concern relates to the state of the art. Caseload planning is a
relatively new idea, and many techniques are still in the early stages of
development. While these techniques will continue to improve, much of this
work will be done outside the legislative process, in the academy or in other
parts of government. A new planning agency should have access to this
technology as it develops. The best way to do this is to authorize the agency
to employ outside experts to work with its staff on particularly difficult
projects. This method has several advantages. Contracting out will allow
Congress to keep the agency small, making it easier to maintain high
professional standards and avoid bureaucratization. It will further the
ongoing education of staff members and improve the quality of their work. It
will give staff members a chance to work closely with other experts in their
respective fields and thus make working for the agency more attractive.
Finally, and most importantly, it will encourage the kind of experimentation
that is likely to improve our ability to do reliable caseload forecasting and
planning.
The picture that emerges is of an agency that resembles the Office of
Technology Assessment ("OTA"). This is no accident. Like OTA, the
proposed agency is intended to assist Congress by conducting technical
evaluations requiring special expertise. As with OTA, this assistance is best
provided by a small, highly qualified staff that has access to research being
done outside the legislative process. And like OTA, the proposed agency will
not revolutionize the legislative process, but it can improve legislation on
issues within its purview.
IV
CONCLUSION

Determining the most efficient way to structure jurisdiction under
particular legislation is neither easy nor obvious, and to do it well requires
experience and expertise. At present, such determinations are seldom made
or are made haphazardly. Caseload planning is a difficult and inexact science.
But why remain blind when we can improve our vision? Instead, we should
create an agency to help us see. Such a body will not solve all our problems,
but it will provide some improvement in the quality of legislation and some
savings in judicial resources-more than enough, I am sure, to justify its costs.

